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I. INTRODUCTION
“International investment in the United States promotes
economic growth, productivity, competitiveness, and
job creation. It is the policy of the United States to
support unequivocally such investment, consistent with
the protection of the national security.” 1

Foreign investment is vital to the continued growth and vitality of the U.S. economy.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce‟s Bureau of Economic Analysis, foreigners
invested an impressive $260.4 billion in the U.S. in 2008, amid a slow national economy and
despite a worldwide decrease in merger and acquisition activities. 2 Foreign investment is a vital
source of job creation, innovation, development and critical to the U.S. manufacturing industry. 3
As of 2006, foreign investors employed more than 5 million Americans and were responsible for
roughly 20% of the U.S. manufacturing GDP. 4 Even though foreign investment is necessary to
the U.S. economy, some critics perceive foreign imports as a threat to the U.S. economy,
sovereignty and national security. Congress enacted the Foreign Investment and National

1

Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008) (amending Exec. Order 11,858 and stating the U.S.
foreign investment policy).
2
See generally, THOMAS ANDERSON, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 54 (2009), available at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2009/06June/0609_fdius.pdf.
3
David Marchick, Remarks Before Senator Baucus Trade and Security Forum 1 (Apr. 3, 2006), available at
https://finance.senate.gov/press/Bpress/2005press/prb040306dm.pdf [hereinafter Marchick‟s Remarks] (noting that
“in some sectors in which the U.S. leads the world, such as the chemicals sector, foreign affiliates are responsible for
almost 30% of the total value created in the U.S. The stock of foreign direct investment in the U.S. has grown from
$185 billion in 1985 to more than $1.5 trillion today.” Marchick argues that “actions to restrict foreign investment in
the United States could lead to retaliation against, or imitation that hurts, U.S. investors abroad. Nevertheless, the
levels of foreign investment in the United States remain relatively low compared to other major industrialized
countries.” According to Marchick, due to the current account deficit the U.S. needs more foreign investment, not
less. In order to eliminate the deficit, “the United States must import more than $2 billion of capital per day. If the
investment environment in the United States is hostile for foreign investment, investors will put their money, jobs
and technology in other economies).” See also, Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics: Exhibit
5 – Exports, Imports and Trade Balance of Goods (April 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/Press-Release/current_press_release/exh5.pdf (indicating that from Jan. to April 2008, the U.S. exported
$110,338 million and imported $180,912 million in goods) [hereinafter Foreign Trade Statistics].
4
See generally Marchick, supra 2.
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Security Act (“FINSA”) 5 to address national security threats involved in certain foreign
investment transactions.
National security concerns justify governmental intervention in certain foreign
investment transactions, but the U.S. must balance that concern with maintaining an open foreign
investment policy. The fear that foreign entities could control American “strategic” industries
triggered many legislative attempts to prevent such control. 6 These attempts started to shape up
more clearly in the 1970‟s and 1980‟s amidst fears of “the Japanese dominance” and investments
from OPEC countries. 7 The September 11, 2001, attacks most recently made the U.S. suspicious
of the outside world, and fearful for its homeland security. The risk of an unsafe homeland
became too real in 2005 when the Dubai World Port, a United Arab Emirates government
company, acquired the rights to manage six main ports in the U.S. Congress reacted almost
immediately and not long after the deal fell through it enacted FINSA. FINSA is a federal statute
that allows the President to block or suspend transactions involving foreign investors when the
transaction imposes a national security risk. From the U.S. perspective, FINSA provides the
framework to ensure that foreign companies do not divest the U.S. of its critical infrastructure,
technology, and defense industry through investment in the U.S. From the foreign investors‟
perspectives, FINSA burdens foreign investment transactions and allows political pressure to
obstruct economically efficient and beneficial transactions.

5

Pub. L. No. 110-49, §§ 2-7(b), 8-10, 121 Stat. 246, 259 (2007) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170
(2000)).
6
See generally, EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
53-54 (Institute for International Economics 1995).
7
See infra notes 9-13 (noting that until 1988 the main U.S. legislation regarding foreign investment was the 1917
Trading with the Enemy Act, the 1975 Executive Order 11,858 creating the CFIUS, and the 1977 International
Emergency Economic Powers Act).
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This article argues that FINSA‟s framework allows political and protectionist
considerations to interfere with and potentially erode the U.S. free foreign investment policy.
Part II of this article provides relevant historical and legislative background about FINSA and the
policy underlying it. Next, it provides information about post-9/11 enforcement of foreign
investment regulations and how these regulations have been strengthening up to FINSA. Finally,
Part II analyzes FINSA‟s key terms and the risks associated with its broad scope and lack of
clear guidance on how to assess national security threats. Part III argues that FINSA‟s lack of
guidance regarding the national security analysis allows protectionist concerns and political
influences to undermine free investment and principals of laissez-faire economics. Secondly,
Part III argues that although national security is a paramount concern, U.S. politicians unjustly
rely on it for political reasons when no national security threat exists. Finally, Part III suggests
that Congress can improve FINSA by focusing on real national security risks, limiting
congressional involvement, and creating a “fast-track” analysis for passive investment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Exon-Florio Regulatory Framework
1. Where it all began: Creating the CFIUS
Throughout U.S. history, policymakers have manifested concern about foreign
investments‟ potential adverse effects on national security. 8 This history dates back to World
War I when the U.S. passed legislation restricting foreign ownership of strategic industry sectors

8

See, e.g., Brendan J. Reed, Sovereign Wealth Funds: the New Barbarians at the Gate? An Analysis of the Legal
and Business Implications of their Ascendancy, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 97, 107-08 (2009) (discussing the historical
public concern on foreign investment‟s effect on national security).
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such as shipping and civil aviation. 9 Concerned with investments from OPEC countries in the
1970‟s Congress enacted the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (“IEEPA”). 10
IEEPA allows the president to seize foreign assets only when he or she declares a state of
national emergency. 11 Thus, the President may regulate foreign acquisition of U.S. companies
through IEEPA, but doing so requires the declaration of a national emergency against the foreign
investor‟s government. Historically, U.S. presidents have been reluctant to invoke IEEPA
because the national emergency declaration is akin to a declaration of hostilities against the
investor‟s country. 12 Thus, the national emergency requirement made IEEPA applicable only to
extreme situations, but inadequate to regulate the great majority of foreign investment operations
(even when national security might be involved). Due to IEEPA‟s diplomatic and political
drawbacks, the president and Congress sought alternative mechanisms to regulate foreign
investment in the U.S.

9

See generally MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1914-1945 634
(Harvard Studies in Business History 2004) (listing the principal legislation affecting foreign investment in the U.S.
from 1914-1945, including: the 1914/1916 Shipping Act; 1917 Espionage Act, and the Trading with the Enemy
Act). For further discussions on World War I legislation regarding foreign assets in the United States see James F. F.
Carroll, Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act’s Conception of National
Security, 23 EMORY INT‟L L. REV. 167, 170-72 (2009) (discussing the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) passed
in 1917 during World War I. The TWEA authorized the President to nationalize the assets of U.S. subsidiaries of
German firms and gave the president broad power to stop any transaction with a foreign country as he saw fit. The
TWEA‟s current version is codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2006)).
10
Pub. L. No. 95-223, title II §§ 202-07, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.§§ 1701-06 (2006)
[hereinafter IEEPA].
11
IEEPA § 1701(a)-(b) (stating in relevant part: “[a]ny authority granted to the President [herein] may be exercised
to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat [ ] to the [U.S] national security, foreign policy, or economy if the
President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat”) (emphasis added). Furthermore, IEEPA
authorizes the president to investigate, regulate, or prohibit any acquisition of any property in which a foreign
country or national has any interest. See IEEPA § 1702(a)(1)(B).
12
See Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional Involvement Is Too Much?, 93
IOWA L. REV. 325, 334 (2007) (noting that presidents have been reluctant to invoke IEEPA in the great majority of
transactions because doing so would be akin to “a declaration of hostilities against the government of the acquirer
company” (quoting Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investments
Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT‟L L. 1, 69 (1989)). Stagg further points out that
the declaration of national emergency requirement made IEEPA inadequate to meet the demands on the president to
regulate foreign investments that affect national security.
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In the 1980‟s Congress feared “the Japanese dominance” and was apprehensive about
the inadequate mechanisms to review foreign transactions 13 in the U.S.14 In response to this
political pressure President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11,858, creating the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”).15 The CFIUS is an inter-agency body
within the Executive Branch, initially responsible for monitoring the impact of foreign
investment in the United States and implementing foreign investment policies. 16 The Department
of Treasury is the CFIUS‟ chair. The Committee consisted originally of six members, but today
it is composed of fourteen member-agencies and departments, including the Departments of
Justice, Homeland Security, Defense, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 17
Executive Order 11,858 did not grant the President or CFIUS authority to block or
suspend any foreign investment transactions. The agency‟s role was merely to review
transactions involving the takeover of U.S. companies by foreign individuals 18 and to evaluate
whether the transaction generally would impose any threat to national security.19 Ultimately,
CFIUS‟ served the limited role to alert the government of potential problems with certain
transactions. Any decision regarding government intervention in individual transactions was left
to Congress (political process), or solved by the application of antitrust or alternative laws. 20

13

For purposes of this article the term “transaction” refers collectively to an acquisition, merger, or takeover of a
U.S. company by a foreign company or individual.
14
See Joanna Rubin Travalini, Comment, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Achieving a Balance
Between National Economy Benefits and National Security Interests, 29 NW. J. INT‟L L. & BUS. 779, 783 (2009)
(commenting on U.S. history in regulating foreign investment).
15
Executive Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975) [hereinafter Executive Order 11,858], (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006)).
16
Executive Order 11,858 § 1.
17
CFIUS Home Page, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Pages/Committee-on-ForeignInvestment-in-US.aspx (follow “Composition of CFIUS” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
18
For purposes of this article the term “individual” refers to both natural persons and legal entities.
19
Executive Order 11,858 § 1(b), (c).
20
See Matthew R. Byrne, Protecting National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintaining the ExonFloxio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 849, 857 (2006).
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This initial CFIUS role was sufficient to make Congress comfortable that at least some
mechanism monitored foreign investment. However, the change in the political-economic
context since Executive Order 11,858 and heightened fear of foreign dominance of U.S. assets
led to legislative initiatives to increase the CFIUS‟ powers and Congress‟ oversight. Three
Congressional bills have affected the CFIUS‟s operation: (1) the Exon-Florio Amendment; (2)
the Byrd Amendment; and (3) FINSA. This article focuses on FINSA, however a background on
the Exon-Florio is particularly important to understanding FINSA.
2. The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act
The Exon-Florio Amendment was passed as part of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 21 (“Exon-Florio”) to amend § 721 of the Defense Production Act of
1950.22 Exon-Florio expanded CFIUS‟s role by authorizing the President to suspend or prohibit
any transactions leading to the control of U.S. companies by foreign persons when: (1) there is
credible evidence of national security threats and; (2) when other legislation cannot provide
“adequate and appropriate authority for the President to protect national security.” 23 The
dramatic increase of foreign ownership of U.S. assets in the mid 1980‟s yielded anti-foreign
sentiments, which reflect the socio-political context of Exon-Florio‟s passage.24 At that time the

21

Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (1988). Congress named Exon-Florio after its primary
sponsors, Sen. John James Exon (D-NE) and Rep. James J. Florio (D-N.J.). For more information on Sen. Exon see
Associated Press, Former Senator J. James Exon, 83, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/13/politics/13exon.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Senator%20James%20Exon&st=cse.
22
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).
23
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021(d)(1)(2), 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (noting that the literal language of the
statute allows the president to act under Exon-Florio upon credible evidence of national security threat and when
“provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act do not [ ] provide
adequate and appropriate authority for the President to protect national security”).
24
See Carroll, supra note 9, at 172-73.
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public opinion discussed the potential negative impacts of foreign investment, such as adverse
effects on domestic employment and trade, political process, and national security. 25
Japan attracted special attention from Congress because of its growing presence as a
successful investor in the U.S. automobile and banking sectors.26 This background set the stage
for the case that provided the principal impetus for the Exon-Florio‟s passage: the 1987 proposed
sale of the U.S-based chip maker Fairchild Semiconductor Company (“Fairchild”) to the
Japanese-based computer maker Fujitsu Corporation (“Fujitsu”). 27 As a major supplier of chips
to the U.S. military, Fairchild was a strategic company to the U.S. defense industry. The
potential Japanese control over such a strategic U.S. company raised several national security
concerns.28 Congress disliked the deal and vociferated national security concerns and political
pressure to terminate the transaction.29 Due to the political pressure and negative publicity over
the deal, Fujitsu withdrew its bid for Fairchild. 30 President Reagan could have blocked the
transaction under the IEEPA, but he was reluctant to declare a state of emergency against Japan,
a Cold War ally. 31
Even though the Fujitsu-Fairchild deal fell through, Congress was displeased with
President Reagan‟s reluctance to block the deal. Congress wanted a stronger mechanism to

25

See Graham & Krugman, supra note 6, at 3-5.
Id. at 53-54 (noting that Honda Motor Company and five other Japanese manufacturers yielded 21.8% of the
automobile production in the U.S. in 1992. The Japanese presence in the banking sector exceeded this percentage).
27
THEODORE H. MORAN, THREE THREATS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CFIUS PROCESS 9 (Peter G.
Peterson Institute for International Economics 2009).
28
Id.
29
See Carroll, supra note 9, at 173.
30
See Donna K. H. Walters, Deal to Sell Fairchild Semiconductor to Fujitsu Canceled, L.A. TIMES, March 17,
1987, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1987-03-17/business/fi-12290_1_fairchild-semiconductor (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010).
31
See Carroll, supra note 9, at 173 (noting that IEEPA‟s wording – requiring a state of emergency declaration essentially made the presidential veto untenable for all but the most extreme transactions).
26
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oversee similar transactions, and as a result it proposed the Exon-Florio bill. 32 The early
Congressional discussions about the Exon-Florio show Congress‟ “long-range concerns
regarding economic and political independence, [as well as national security].” 33 The House
Committee Report regarding House Bill 3 and section 907 (one of the early versions of the ExonFlorio Amendment) pointed to the proposed takeover of Fairchild by Fujitsu as an example of a
transaction detrimental to national security. 34
When the bill reached the Senate some Senators ardently supported it, but others
criticized the inclusion of broad economic factors, such as “economic security” and “national
unemployment” in the determination of a transaction‟s effect on national security. 35 The
Executive branch and others who opposed the original bill feared that it could impede beneficial
foreign investment.36 After long debates and President Reagan‟s threat to veto the bill, Congress
passed a final version that excluded the broad commercial regulation provisions. 37 Congress
attached the Exon-Florio to the Defense Production Act of 1950 to limit it to the national security
context.38 Following the enactment of Exon-Florio39 President Reagan issued Executive Order

32

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt.2, at 47 (1987).
34
H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt.2, at 48 (1987) (the Committee argued that semiconductors were essential to national
defense, and its loss to a foreign country would be disastrous).
35
See id. at pt. 2 at 25 (statement of Sen. James J. Exon). See also Federal Collection of Information on Foreign
Investment in the U.S.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 100th Cong. 10 (1988)
(statement of John W. Bryant, Rep. from Texas); Byrne, supra note 20, at 862-63 (discussing the broad “essential
commerce” and “economic welfare” goals that were proposed as part of the CFIUS‟s review process, but which
were ultimately rejected); Carroll, supra note 9, at 174.
36
See Howard E. O‟Leary & Judy Parker Jenkins, “Exon-Florio”: An Impediment to Foreign Investment in the
United States?, 69 MICH. B. J. 680, 681 (1990) (criticizing Exon-Florio).
37
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, S. 1420, 100th Cong. § 1401 (1987); see also 19 U.S.C. § 2901
(1988).
38
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, S. 1420, 100th Cong. § 1401.
39
50. U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).
33
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12,661 delegating to CFIUS his authority to examine transactions for national security concerns
and retaining the power to suspend or prohibit a transaction. 40
The U.S. had its first major systematic regulation of foreign investment. For the first time
Congress expressly authorized the President to block specific private transactions on national
security grounds, without having to declare emergency or hostilities against the investor‟s
country. Under Exon-Florio, the President or his designee-CFIUS has broad authority to
investigate the national security effects of transactions by or with foreign individuals that could
result in foreign control of U.S companies. 41 Not surprisingly “control” includes any type of
arrangement that would allow the foreign investor to direct the decisions of the acquired
American entity, 42 which illustrates the broad sweep of the statute.
a. Exon-Florio’s CFIUS Review Process in a Nutshell
The Exon-Florio review process starts with the filing of a voluntary notice to CFIUS by
the parties to a covered transaction. 43 The filing must contain a description of the transaction,
appropriate timelines, a list of target assets, and the parties‟ detailed background.44 The CFIUS
has thirty days to determine whether to conduct an investigation. 45 Each CFIUS member
(agencies and departments) conducts its own internal analysis and presents its conclusions to the
Committee. If the CFIUS finds at this point that the transaction does not pose any national
security threat, it will not conduct any further investigation and the parties may consummate the
deal without U.S. interference on the grounds of national security. However, if the CFIUS
40

Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (West 1991 & Supp. 2009).
42
See 31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (2005).
43
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a)(3) (West 1991 & Supp. 2009) (defining “covered transaction” as a merger,
acquisition, or takeover by or with foreign persons, which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in
interstate commerce).
44
See Travalini, supra note 14, at 785.
45
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E).
41
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determines that an investigation is warranted, then it must investigate the deal and reach a
conclusion within forty-five days. 46 Within fifteen days after completion of the investigation, the
President must announce whether or not to block the transaction. 47 In order to block a transaction
the President must find credible evidence that the transaction would impair national security and
that no other provision of law provides the necessary relief to ameliorate the national security
threat.48
Although the Exon-Florio language does not mandate the CFIUS notification filing,
failure to do so allows the President to take the extreme measure of post-consummation
divestiture.49 The practical result is that most parties to a proposed foreign acquisition file
notifications expecting to obtain CFIUS clearance to avoid, or at least minimize, future risks of
divestiture.50 This is illustrated by the two hundred notifications filed in 1989 compared to just
fourteen notifications in filed in 1988, the year of Exon-Florio‟s enactment.51
b. Exon-Florio’s National Security and Confidentiality Provisions
The Exon-Florio does not define the term “national security,” nor did the regulations that
followed the Amendment.52 Congress did this intentionally so that national security remained a
broad and flexible concept so the law did not stifle the President‟s ability to affirmatively act. 53
The government anticipated that any definition of national security would give foreign entities

46

Id. at §2170(b)(2)(C).
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d)(2) (West 1991 & Supp. 2010).
48
Id. § 2170(d).
49
Id.
50
See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT – IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO
& RELATED AMENDMENTS 3 (1995), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96012.pdf [hereinafter GAO
1995 Report].
51
Id. at 4.
52
31 C.F.R. § 800 app. A, § II (2005)
53
Id.
47
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and sophisticated attorneys the opportunity to structure transactions to get around the definition
thereby creating a loophole.54
The Exon-Florio laid out several factors to test whether a transaction related to national
security. The factors assess whether: (1) the deal affects domestic production needed for
projected national defense; (2) the transaction affects the capability and capacity of domestic
industries to meet national defense; and (3) whether foreign citizens‟ control of domestic
industries affects the United States‟ capability to meet national security requirements. 55
It is unclear how the CFIUS weighs and analyzes each factor because Exon-Florio has a
confidentiality provision, which prevents public release of detailed information on CFIUSreviewed transactions. 56 Thus, most of CFIUS‟ review process information is not publicly
available, and much of the information that becomes available is often provided by the very
companies involved in the transactions. The 1995 Exon-Florio report to Congress suggests that
an important factor the Committee takes into consideration is the possibility that foreign
countries gain control over key industries critical to national security. 57 Consequently, the
government focuses on the preservation and promotion of its leadership in technologies that are
crucial to the U.S. defense system. 58 Even though these factors are helpful in identifying CFIUS‟
issues based on the industry sector targeted by the investor, they still do not provide very clear
guidelines. Thus the analysis of two landmark Exon-Florio transactions helps to shed some light
into how the government enforces the Amendment.

54

Byrne, supra note 20, at 867.
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (e)(1)-(3) (West 1991 & Supp. 2010).
56
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(c) (2006) (stating in relevant part: “[a]ny information or documentary material filed with
[the CFIUS] pursuant to this section shall be exempt from disclosure…and no such information or documentary
material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding”).
57
See GAO 1995 Report, supra note 50, at 2.
58
Id.
55
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c. The CATIC-MAMCO Transaction
On November 3, 1989 MAMCO Manufacturing Inc. (“MAMCO”) filed a voluntary
notification to CFIUS about its proposed sale to China National Aero-Technology Import &
Export Corporation‟s (“CATIC”).59 MAMCO was a Seattle based U.S. aircraft parts
manufacturer, which had never exported any of its products. CATIC was a People‟s Republic of
China government-related manufacturer of civilian and military aircrafts, aircraft engines, and
missiles.60 During the 30-day review process, CFIUS raised national security issues because it
was concerned that sensitive technology held by MAMCO would be transferred to CATIC
absent export controls. 61 Before the CFIUS completed the takeover review, CATIC purchased
all MAMCO‟s voting securities, completing the transaction.62
Shortly after the transaction‟s closing, the CFIUS unanimously concluded that it posed
national security threats. The Committee reasoned that: (1) CATIC had ties to the Chinese
military; (2) the transaction would give CATIC “unique access” to U.S. aerospace companies;
and (3) some of the technology produced by MAMCO was export-controlled. 63 On February 3,
1990 the New York Times reported that “Bush, Citing Security Law, Voids Sale of Aviation
Concern to China.”64 Based on CFIUS‟ unanimous recommendations President George H. W.
Bush ordered the divestiture of MAMCO by CATIC. Some speculated that CATIC‟s past actions

59

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATEMENT OF ALLAN I. MENDELOWITZ DIRECTOR INT‟L TRADE,
ENERGY, AND FIN. ISSUES BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE, CONSUMER PROT. AND COMPETITIVENESS 4
(1990) [hereinafter Allan Mendelowitz‟s Statement], http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat11/140886.pdf.
60
Nuclear Threat Initiative - CATIC‟s profile, http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles/China/index.html (last visited
on Nov. 12, 2010).
61
Allan Mendelowitz‟s Statement, supra note 59, at 5.
62
Id. at 4.
63
Byrne, supra note 20, at 872.
64
Andrew Rosenthal, Bush, Citing Security Law, Voids Sale of Aviation Concern to China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
1990, at 1.
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and connections to the Chinese government motivated the President‟s decision. 65 Because of the
Exon-Florio‟s confidentiality provision the public will never ascertain Bush‟s actual motivation.
The CATIC-MAMCO deal was the first and only transaction that a president has ever formally
blocked after a negative recommendation from CFIUS.66
d. The Thomson-CSF and LTV Corporation Transaction
In 1992 Congress and the national media paid close attention to another extremely
controversial CFIUS transaction. Thomson-CSF, Inc. (“Thomson”), a French government-owned
company participated in a complex bidding process to acquire LTV Corporation (“LTV”), a U.S.
company that owned an aerospace division. The LTV missile division‟s primary customer was
the U.S. government and LTV held classified Department of Defense (“DOD”) contracts. 67 LTV
filed for bankruptcy and needed to raise cash. In order to obtain liquidity, the Bankruptcy Court
in New York approved the sale of LTV‟s missile division and considered proposals from
Thomson, Martin Marietta (a U.S. Aerospace company), and Lockheed (a U.S-owned
company).68 The Court hesitated to consider Thomson‟s bid because of the risk that CFIUS
would not approve the transaction. 69 However, Thomson was confident that it would secure
CFIUS clearance and it made an offer to pay LTV a $20 million “reverse break-up fee” in the
event it failed to close the transaction due to inability to obtain U.S. approval. 70
Thomson‟s bid won and the company filed a CFIUS notice regarding the takeover.
Meanwhile Congress and the Pentagon expressed concerns about the potential leakage of LTV‟s
65

Id.
See COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – PUBLIC
VERSION 2 (2008), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUSAnnual-Rpt-2008.pdf [hereinafter CFIUS 2008 report](last visited on Jan. 8, 2011).
67
In Re Chateaugay, 198 B.R. 848, 850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
68
See Moran, supra note 27, at 16.
69
In Re Chateaugay, 198 B.R. at 852.
70
Id.
66

14
THE WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW RAZA JOURNAL

VOLUME 2

Winter 2011

ISSUE 1

classified information and defense technology to Thomson‟s parent company in France. 71
Numerous members of Congress strongly objected to the acquisition and proposed at least a few
bills designed to block the deal.72
Martin Marietta (Thomson‟s U.S. competitor) used the national security argument to
fight Thomson‟s takeover and to try to get back into the bidding process. 73 Marietta argued that
Thomson had sold military equipment to Iraq in the past, and could easily sell LTV‟s technology
to a U.S. enemy again following consummation of the deal. 74 Congress held multiple hearings
about the Thomson-LTV deal and continued to pressure both the CFIUS and Thomson. The
DOD conducted extensive negotiations with Thomson regarding potential mitigation agreements
To prevent Thomson‟s access to LTV‟s export-controlled information, “the DOD conducted
extensive negotiations with Thomson regarding potential mitigation agreements.” However,
they failed to reach an agreement.75 Ultimately the DOD strongly opposed the transaction
because Thomson had provided radar equipment to Iraq during the Gulf War, implicating what
the DOD deemed a national security risk. 76
Thompson finally accepted the defeat in its attempt to acquire LTV and withdrew from
the CFIUS process. CFIUS never issued a formal opinion disapproving the Thomson-LTV deal.
However, Congress‟ pressure, the public opinion, and the political context strongly support the
inference that CFIUS would issue a negative recommendation. As a final defeat to Thomson, the
Bankruptcy court enforced the “reverse break-up fee” provision of the bid and forced Thomson

71

Moran, supra note 27, at 16.
See Eric Schmitt, G.A.O. Investigator Opposes LTV Unit Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992 at D4.
73
Byrne, supra note 20, at 873.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 873-874.
76
Id. at 874.
72
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to pay $20 million to LTV.77 This outcome undoubtedly defeated Thomson and sent a clear
message to foreign investors interested in purchasing U.S. defense industry companies.
Nevertheless Congress remained dissatisfied and anticipated that other transactions involving a
foreign government could occur without appropriate review mechanisms. Thus, it decided to
strengthen the Exon-Florio.
e. The Byrd Amendment
In immediate response to the Thomson-LTV landmark case, Congress passed the Byrd
Amendment (“Byrd Amendment”) to section 721 of the Defense Production Act. This
Amendment mandates CFIUS investigation of: (1) any transaction involving an entity controlled
or acting on behalf of a foreign government; (2) seeking to acquire control of an American
company; (3) which “could affect” U.S. national security. 78 This section lowered the standard
that would trigger a review of an acquisition from a “threat to national security” standard used
for private business to the “could affect” national security standard for foreign-government
related transactions. The loosening of this provision indicates a high likelihood that CFIUS will
review any foreign-government transaction involving a U.S. business. 79 It also suggests that
CFIUS could easily classify any transaction by, with, or involving a foreign government as a
national security threat.
Additionally, the Byrd Amendment added two more factors to the Exon-Florio‟s original
list of national security assessment factors. Under the Byrd Amendment, CFIUS can consider the
77

See In Re Chateaugay Corp., No. 96-5110, 1997 WL 138384, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 1997) (upholding the
enforcement of the reverse break up fee and finding it irrelevant, for purposes of the purchase contract (bid), that
Thomson used its best efforts to try to reach a deal with, and obtain approval from the government). Thomson
challenged the enforceability of the reserve breakup fee, since it was unable to perform its purchasing obligations
due to governmental opposition to the deal. Id. However, the court affirmed the imposition of the contractual fee. Id.
78
National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, §837, 106 Stat. 2315, 2463-65
(1992) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006)).
79
See Carroll, supra note 9, at 176.
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transaction‟s potential effect on various military sales to foreign countries and its potential effect
on the U.S.‟s technological leadership role in the area. 80 The “potential effect” language makes
it easier for CFIUS to reject transactions that might eventually affect military sales or the U.S.
technological leadership, without the need to assess the actual likelihood that it could occur.
Finally, the Byrd Amendment requires that CFIUS send a report to Congress at the
conclusion of any investigation 81 to allow Congress to exert political pressure in the CFIUS‟
Exon-Florio implementation. The Byrd Amendment also requires the President to report to
Congress as to whether credible evidence of a foreign coordinated strategy to acquire U.S.
critical technology companies, or industrial espionage exists. 82 The higher scrutiny levels and the
Congressional notification provisions sent a clear message to CFIUS that Congress would
carefully observe and review CFIUS‟ recommendations and decisions.

B. Post 9/11 Application of Exon-Florio: Finding the Balance Between
National Security and Open Foreign Investment
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has heightened
national security standards and has reviewed foreign-related transactions with greater scrutiny. 83
A primary theme in recent U.S. government practices includes a stronger defensive position and
broader security measures.84 The 9/11 attacks changed the paradigm of state-actors‟ security
threats to non-state actors‟ security threats. As described by Travalini, “the CFIUS responded to
the threat of terrorism by tightening the requirements for approval of foreign acquisitions and

80

50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f)(4)-(5).
See id. § 2170(b)(3)(A).
82
Id. § 2170(m)(3)(A)(ii).
83
Travalini, supra note 14, at 787.
84
Gregory W. Bowman, Thinking Outside the Border: Homeland Security and the Forward Deployment of the U.S.
Border, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 189, 200-01 (2007).
81
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adding the Department of Homeland Security to its membership in 2003.”85 Despite this higher
standard of scrutiny, the official statistics show that most transactions are likely to obtain CFIUS
approval, which has been a point of criticism to the CFIUS. 86 However, many of these approvals
have been conditioned to the foreign investor‟s willingness to enter into mitigation agreements.
Mitigation agreements involve a broad range of measures to restrict or limit the foreign
investor‟s control over the acquire business. Such agreement can require the purchaser to
provide representations and assurances to the CFIUS, as well as voting control mechanisms (to
limit or eliminate control of the U.S. entity by the foreign investor). 87 From 1997 to 2008 the
government entered into fifty-two mitigation agreements.88
Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government has fought to achieve a balance between
increasing national security protection through foreign investment regulation and maintaining
investment freedom. 89 Many post 9/11 transactions have raised Congressional concerns over the
quality of the CFIUS and Exon-Florio‟s analytical scheme. It seems that national security is not
only a legitimate concern of the highest order, but also a reason for the government to intervene
in private transactions involving unpopular foreign investors.
Selective involvement in such transactions may have occurred in 2005 when the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”) made an $18.5 billion cash bid for the
California-based oil company Unocal Corporation (“Unocal”). 90 When CNOOC publicly

85

Travalini, supra note 14, at 787.
See GAO 1995 Report, supra note 50, at 4. CFIUS 2008 Report, supra note 66, at 15.
87
See CFIUS 2008 Report, supra note 66, at 15.
88
Id.
89
Travalini, supra note 14, at 787.
90
See Moran, supra note 27, at 18-19 (analyzing the CNOOC proposed purchase of Unocal and concluding that a
less superficial analysis would have led to the conclusion that there was no real national security threat related to the
transaction). Moran points out that oil supply sources were not tightly concentrated and switching costs were not
high. Thus even it the deal went through, the U.S. would have had 21 countries (including 15 non-OPEC countries)
86
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announced the bid, Congress was outraged and expressed serious concerns regarding the
possibility that a foreign investor could take control of a domestic energy company. It urged
strict CFIUS review of the deal and expressed its concern “about China‟s ongoing and proposed
acquisition of energy assets around the world, including those in the United States.”91 According
to Congress introduced various bills that could have prevented the transaction and it conducted
hearings regarding potential changes to the Exon-Florio.92 CNOOC ultimately withdrew its bid
due to the “political environment in the United States.”93 Instead of the deal receiving an
objective evaluation into the possible risks, the political climate thwarted the purchaser from
pursuing the deal. The American Chevron Corporation took advantage of the negative publicity
and security concerns and purchased Unocal. 94 The termination of this deal sent another clear
message to foreign investors that they would incur significant political opposition if they attempt
to invest in the U.S. energy industry.
1. The Dubai Ports World and P&O Steam Navigation Transaction
“Don‟t let them tell you this is just the transfer of title.
Baloney. We wouldn‟t transfer title to the Devil;
that would have immediate availability of oil to export to the U.S. Such alternative supply sources were greater than
Unocal‟s entire U.S. production. Additionally, six more countries could be called on to make up for large portion of
Unocal‟s U.S. output. The result is that U.S. buyers would simply replace Unocal‟s “minuscule” production with
extra imports without a great economic impact. Finally Moran argues that the U.S. energy needs would have been
better served by energy policies that promote efficiency and stimulate new energy sources rather than focusing on
blocking deals of this kind). Id.
91
See Travalini, supra note 14, at 788 (citing Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic
Assets: The Challenge of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World, 13 LAW &
BUS. REV. AM. 381, 382 (2007).
92
Byrne, supra note 20, at 876.
93
See Travalini, supra note 14, at 789 (citing Gauray Sud, From Takeovers to Vetting CIFUS: Finding a Balance in
U.S. Policy Regarding Foreging Acquisitions of Domestic Assets, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNT‟L L. 1303, 1306 (2006);
Carroll, supra note 9, at 181-82 (pointing out that the opponents to the CNOOC-Unocal deal‟s main argument was
that the purchase would “give China more leverage over the international oil market, and regardless of the facts to
this specific transaction, the symbolic nature of giving in to China‟s resource goals should be prevented at all costs.”
“Unsurprisingly, hawkish arguments toward China played a large role in congressional opposition to the deal.” Id. at
181. He further points out that energy companies have no direct connection to the military, and could not impose
any direct threat to the U.S. economy or national security). Id. at 181-182.
94
See Travalini, supra note 14, at 789.Id.
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we‟re not going to transfer title to Dubai.” 95
Not long after the CNOOC-Unocal transaction fell through, Congress faced another
challenge in balancing national security concerns with foreign investment. Dubai Ports World
(“DPW”), a United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) government-owned company entered into an
agreement to purchase London-based Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company
(“P&O”). The British-P&O managed the operation of six major U.S. ports, including New York,
Baltimore and Miami. 96 In October 2005 the two companies informally informed CFIUS that
they would seek review of the transaction. 97 The CFIUS then requested an intelligence
assessment of DPW, which showed that DPW had neither the intention nor the capability to
threaten U.S. national security. 98 CFIUS did not identify national security issues in this
transaction because DPW would neither be in charge of the ports themselves nor port security.
Rather, it would manage terminal port operations without acquiring the ports themselves. 99
Moreover, the Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection would remain in charge
of port security. Based on this previous assessment, DPW and P&O filed their formal notices
with the CFIUS requesting review of the transaction on December 16, 2005. 100
On January 17, 2006 the CFIUS announced its approval of the transaction, and on
February 24 it issued a press release in a public acknowledgment of the transaction‟s approval. 101
This was very unusual considering the Exon-Florio‟s confidentiality provision requiring all

95

Moran, supra note 27, at 24 (citing Senator Frank Lautenberg‟s (D-NJ) statement about the DPW-P&O deal).
Jonathan Weisman & Bradley Graham, Dubai Firm to Sell U.S. Port Operation, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2006,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/09/AR2006030901124.html.
97
Travalini, supra note 14, at 789.
98
Press Release, Dep‟t of the Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the National Security in the Dubai Ports World
Bid for Ports Operations (Feb. 24, 2006), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/js4071.aspx [hereinafter Treasury Press Release Feb. 24, 2006](last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
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investigations to remain unavailable to the public. Congress voiced strong concerns that the
CFIUS review neglected national security considerations. 102 Critics to the transaction argued that
UAE had a history as an operational and financial base for hijackers who carried out the 9/11
attacks.103 They further argued that DPW could be influenced by Al-Qaeda into weakening ports‟
security. 104 Even though DPW offered assurances that its key employees in the U.S. would be
American citizens, and it committed to the additional 45-day CFIUS review period, the
transaction simply could not overcome Congress‟ opposition. 105 Some members of Congress
proposed emergency legislation with antiterrorism appeal. 106 President George W. Bush
supported the deal and threatened to veto any congressional action blocking it. However, after
several weeks of controversy, political pressure and negative publicity, DPW decided to drop its
bid. It sold P&O‟s American port operations to American International Group (“AIG”). 107
After the DPW incident Congress deemed the CFIUS review under Exon-Florio
inadequate to protect national security under the current state of affairs of terrorist threats. In an
attempt to expand the scope of foreign investment regulation Congress prepared another
amendment to Exon-Florio, broadening the interpretation of national security.
C. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007
“Unless the United States continues to welcome foreign investment,
[it] could find [itself] more and more isolated in an increasingly
interdependent world. Maintaining an open environment for
investment is, in itself, deeply in the national security interest of the

102

See Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National Security or a Tempest
in a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 606 (2007).
103
Id.
104
See Carroll, supra note 9, at 184.
105
Mostaghel, supra note 102, at 609-10.
106
Id. at 612 (discussing the legislation proposed to prohibit the DPW-P&O transaction, and prevent sales of U.S.
port operations to companies with foreign ownership).
107
See Joan Gralla, AIG NY-NJ OK Pact with DP World for Newark Port, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2007, available at
http://www. reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN1665883120070218.
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United States.”108
On July 26, 2007 President Bush signed the FINSA into law. 109 FINSA amends the
Defense Production Act of 1950 and replaces many of Exon-Florio‟s provisions. FINSA
represents a victory for Congress in the long-running struggle to expand the covered transactions,
broaden the national security concept and increase congressional oversight. FINSA keeps the
Exon-Florio basic structure in place and expressly reaffirms CFIUS‟s role in reviewing foreign
investment transactions.110
The main additions brought in by FINSA can be summarized as follows: (1) it expands
the concept of national security to include issues relating to “homeland security”;111 (2) expands
„covered transactions‟ to include transactions involving „critical infrastructure‟; 112 (3) includes
additional factors that CFIUS might consider in its assessment of national security threats; 113 (4)
expressly authorizes CFIUS to require mitigation agreements and monitor compliance; 114 (5)
prohibits notice withdrawals without CFIUS prior approval; 115 (7) expands Congressional access
to CFIUS transactions‟ specific information;116 and (8) provides for civil penalties if parties to a

108

Marchick‟s Remarks, supra note 3, at 3.
Pub. L. No. 110-49, §§ 2-7(b), 8-10, 121 Stat. 246, 259 (2007) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2000)).
110
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k) (codifying the CFIUS, establishing its membership, role, and authority in the
implementation of Exon-Florio); See also Stagg, supra note 12, at 351 (arguing that CFIUS‟s statutory
establishment strengthened its authority and “prompted companies to be more receptive to its requirement”).
111
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(5).
112
See Id. at § 2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(III).
113
Id. § 2170(f)(6)-(10).
114
See Id. §§ 2170(l), 2170(l)(3)(B)(ii).
115
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(C)(ii).
116
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2170(b)(3)(A)-(C), 2170(m)(1)-(2) (subsection 2 states the content requirements of the annual
reports that CFIUS shall issue to Congress, which include, inter alia: a list of all notices filed and all reviews or
investigations completed in the period; a detailed discussion of all perceived adverse effects of covered transactions
on the national security or critical infrastructure of the United States; specific cumulative and, as appropriate, trend
information on the business sectors involved and the countries from which the investments have been made).
109
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transaction violate FINSA and/or mitigation agreements. 117 The additional factors that CFIUS
can consider in its national security analysis under FINSA specifically target, inter alia,
situations that involve terrorist-related parties or countries. For example, the statute allows the
CFIUS to consider whether the foreign government involved in the transaction has adhered to
non-proliferation regimes, as well as that country‟s relationship with the U.S. (specifically in
regards to “cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts”).118
FINSA maintains the Exon-Florio provision that precludes judicial review of any
findings regarding national security, and actions blocking or suspending reviewed
transactions.119 The obvious result is that foreign investors cannot seek relief from CFIUS or
Presidential decisions in U.S. Courts. FINSA also requires CFIUS to issue guidance on the types
of reviewed transactions that presented national security and critical infrastructure concerns. 120
This is a positive change from the previous statute because it increases transparency and
advances foreign investors‟ awareness about the threshold of risk deemed acceptable by CFIUS.
1. Interpreting FINSA’s Key Terms
On January 23, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,456 implementing
FINSA and directing the CFIUS to issue additional regulations. 121 On November 14, 2008, the
CFIUS issued the required regulations, which focused heavily in defining “covered transaction”

117

Id. § 2170(h)(3)(A); 31 C.F.R. § 800.801 (a)-(g)(2008) (establishing civil penalties not to exceed $ 250,000 for
intentional or negligent submission of material misstatements, omissions, false certifications and violation of
mitigation agreements).
118
Id. § 2170(f)(9)(A)-(B).
119
Id. § 2170(e).
120
Id. §2170(b)(2)(E).
121
Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008) (amending Exec. Order 11,858).
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and “control” under FINSA.122 However, the key concept of “national security” remained
undefined. The following subsections discuss key FINSA terms according to the CFIUS‟ 2008
regulations.
a. “National Security”
Like the situation with Exon-Florio, neither FINSA nor the regulations define the term
“national security” or the phrase “threatens to impair the national security.” 123 However, FINSA
does expand the concept of national security to include “issues relating to „homeland security,
including its application to critical infrastructure.‟”124 Furthermore, the statute defines critical
infrastructure as a “system or asset, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the [U.S.] that [its]
incapacity or destruction… would have a debilitating impact on national security” (emphasis
added).125 But this is as far as FINSA and the regulations go into defining national security.
FINSA instead provides a list of illustrative factors for CFIUS and the President to consider in
assessing whether the transaction poses national security risks. 126
The Exon-Florio and Byrd amendments already covered some of these factors, however
FINSA added some key factors. Under FINSA, the CFIUS may also consider: (1) the potential
national security related effects on U.S. critical technologies; (2) the potential effects on the
long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and

122

See THE DEP‟T OF THE TREASURY, CFIUS REFORM: FINAL REGULATIONS ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 14 1-2 (2008),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUS-FinalRegulations-new.pdf [hereinafter CFIUS Regulations].
123
See 50 U.S.C. app. §2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(I).
124
Id. at §2170(a)(5); See also Moran, supra note 27, at 5 (explaining that “critical” and “essential” are introduced
by FINSA without qualification, leaving the potential for protectionist mischief. Under the current unqualified
standard the door is open for assertions that every “critical” and “essential” industry sector should be kept in the
hands of home-country citizens or business.).
125
See U.S.C. app. §2170(a)(6); see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.208 (2008).
126
See Guidance Concerning the Nat‟l Sec. Review Conducted by the Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States,
73 Fed. Reg. 74,569 (Dec. 8, 2008).
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materials; (3) the potential national security related effects on critical infrastructure including
major energy assets; (4) the potential effects of the transaction on the sales of military goods,
equipment, or technology to countries that present concerns related to terrorism and missile
proliferation; and (5) the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military
applications, including the relevant country‟s export control system. 127
These additional factors clearly provide more information to foreign investors, which
prior to FINSA, lacked information given the confidential nature of the investigation process. 128
Nevertheless, the president retains broad discretion to determine if the transaction presents any
national security considerations. The CFIUS 2008 Guidance suggests that national security risk
is a result of the interaction between threat and vulnerability of a particular industry sector, and
the potential consequences of such interaction to national security. 129 But there is no simple or
“CFIUS-proof” standard.
The intention remains to keep “national security” a broad and flexible concept so that the
President to can act in his or her discretion whenever necessary to protect the nation. The
downside of this flexibility is that national security might in many cases turn out to mean
whatever the President decides it to be under the circumstances, to the detriment of the necessary
freedom of foreign investment.
b. “Covered Transaction” and “Control”
FINSA defines “covered transaction” as any “merger, acquisition, or takeover…by or
with any foreign person, which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate

127

Id. at 74,469-70.
See Stagg, supra note 12, at 348.
129
Id.
128
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commerce in the United States” (emphasis added).130 Control is a key threshold concept of
FINSA because both the CFIUS authority to review a transaction and the president‟s power to
block it are predicated on foreign control of an American company engaged in interstate
commerce.
The regulations define “control” in a very broad manner. Control includes any form of
direct or indirect power, through ownership of voting interests, or any formal or informal
contractual arrangement that would otherwise allow the acquiring company to decide important
matters affecting the target entity. 131 “Important matters affecting the target entity” relate, but are
not limited to, its sale, transfer of assets, reorganization, closing, alteration of production, entry
into, and termination of contracts.132 This means that not only mergers and acquisitions are
subject to analysis, but also the acquisition of stock interests with voting rights, forming a joint
venture, and the conversion of convertible voting securities. 133 Control is a case-by-case analysis,
and neither FINSA nor the regulations specify a certain percentage of shares or number of board
seats that a foreign investor has to hold in order to have “control” of the U.S. entity.
On the other hand, an important exception to the covered transactions is the “passive
investment” scenario. Under the regulations a foreign person does not control an entity if it
satisfies a two-pronged test. First the CFIUS assess whether a foreign person holds ten percent or
less of the outstanding voting interest in the entity, second, whether it holds its investment solely

130

50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3) (emphasis added). See also 31 C.F.R. at § 800.212 (2008) (defining “foreign entity”
as any entity, group or subdivision thereof, in whatever form organized, with “its principal place of business outside
the United States or its equity securities primarily traded on one or more foreign exchanges”).
131
See 31 C.F.R. §800.204 (a)(1)-(10).
132
Id. (listing all the important matters affecting the target entity, which the CFIUS will consider when assessing
control).
133
See also Id. at § 800.204(c)(1)-(6) (excluding from “control” certain minority shareholder protections, i.e., the
power to prevent an entity from entering into contracts with majority investors); See also §800.204(d) (clarifying
that the CFIUS will consider on a case-by-case basis whether other non-listed minority shareholder protections do
not confer control over an entity).
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for the purpose of passive investment. 134 Passive investment occurs when the foreign investor
has no plan or intent to control the entity, or ever develops or possesses any purpose other than
passive investment.135 Even though such passive investment is not a „covered transaction‟ this is
a determination that the CFIUS will make, not the parties themselves. Thus, the parties to such a
transaction still must file a CFIUS notification and obtain an official holding that the deal is not a
„covered transaction.‟136
Finally, foreign investors should be aware that the CFIUS‟s analysis focuses on substance
over form. This means that the CFIUS will disregard legal devices or other arrangements entered
into for the purpose of avoiding FINSA. Instead, the CFIUS will analyze the substance of the
transaction regardless of its legal form. 137
c. “Certifications to Congress”
FINSA has significantly increased Congress‟ ability to access confidential information
relating to transactions that have undergone CFIUS review. FINSA provides that upon
completion of CFIUS investigations, the Secretary of Treasury shall transmit a certified notice
and subsequent written report to Congress on the results of the investigation. 138 Each certified
notice and report shall contain a description of the actions taken by CFIUS with respect to the
transaction, and the factors that were determinative in the transaction analysis. 139 Furthermore,

134

31 C.F.R. § 800.302(b) (2005).
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each certified notice and report shall state that there are no unresolved national security concerns
with the reported transaction. 140
This certification requirement allows Congress to access to confidential information that
was not otherwise available to it under the Exon-Florio structure. However, the main concern
about this information-sharing is that FINSA does not prevent Congress from releasing the
contents of the reports to the public. 141 For example, FINSA allows the Majority and Minority
Leaders of the Senate, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, the House Committee on
Financial Services, as well as the staff of any authorized Congressmen to gain access to CFIUS
information. 142 State senators may even access confidential information about transactions
involving critical infrastructure and companies that have a principal place of business in their
state.143
III. ANALYSIS
The CFIUS process under Exon-Florio allowed for great political pressure and
considerations other than national security to play a role in foreign investment transactions in the
U.S. FINSA‟s broad national security concept and lack of clear guidance‟s as to how the U.S.
government will access national security risks will likely perpetuate the same problems of
political pressure, persecution of unpopular investors, and protectionism concerns that occurred
under the previous regulations. Under this regulatory scheme, foreign investors carry the risk of
having their transaction blocked under the proxy of national security when such threat may not
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actually be present. While the nation‟s security is a concern of the highest order, past cases
reveal that even in the absence of national security risks, Congress has used political pressure to
delay and prevent unpopular foreign investors‟ deals to further protectionist concerns. This result
erodes the U.S. free foreign investment policy and principals of laissez-faire economics, and has
the potential to stifle U.S. economic growth by driving away efficient investment.

A. FINSA’s Lack of Analytical Guidance for National Security Risks has the
Potential to Turn FINSA into an Instrument for Protectionism
Fear of foreign control of U.S. industries has politicized the CFIUS review process under
Exon-Florio, and FINSA perpetuates this model. The CFIUS‟s unchecked interpretation of
national security concerns permit the U.S. government to use FINSA as a tool to perpetuate
protectionism and threaten efficient economic investment that has made the United States a
global economic leader.
First, FINSA‟s broad national security concept fails to provide analytical guidance to
distinguish between serious and implausible national security threats. The terms “critical,” as
applied to technology and infrastructure, is introduced without qualification, leaving the potential
for protectionist abuse. 144 For example, FINSA fails to provide guidance regarding when the
CFIUS should consider the fact that the existence of a multiplicity of alternative supplies to the
critical infrastructure would render any attempt to delay, deny, or place conditions on supply
access entirely non-credible. This lack of Congressional guidance to the CFIUS is problematic
because it permits the government to assume that every “critical” sector of the U.S. industry
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should be kept in the hands of home-country citizens or business when little or not security issue
is at risk. 145
That same problem related to critical infrastructure also exists in regards to military
goods. For instance, FINSA and the CFIUS regulations fail to consider whether alternative
sources for the sale of military goods are easily available. 146 Instead, the CFIUS identifies that a
defense related or critical infrastructure industry will be under foreign control, and that fact alone
becomes determinative to the deal.147 For example, in the CNOOC-Unocal deal, political
pressure resulted in CNOOC‟s withdrawal prior to the conclusion of the CFIUS analysis. 148
However, nothing indicated that either CFIUS or Congress considered the fact that twenty one
countries, (including fifteen non-OPEC countries) had oil for export greater than Unocal‟s entire
U.S. production, and that six more could supplement a large portion of Unocal‟s U.S. output. 149
The conclusion that CNOOC‟s acquisition of Unocal would have affected the U.S.
national energy interests was far out from reality. Congressional and the public opinion reaction,
driven by protectionist sentiments, failed to consider the true economic reality behind the
proposed transaction. 150 The U.S. government used national security as a proxy to drive away an
unpopular investor. Under FINSA‟s broad national security and critical infrastructure umbrella,
the government has set a dangerous precedent that permits it to terminate future deals similarly
to the CNOOC-Unocal case. The risk remains high that Congress and other governmental
agencies will use FINSA as a protectionist tool given that CFIUS‟s analysis does not take into
145
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account the availability of alternative supply sources at no great additional costs to the
economy. 151
Second, the definition of national security changes with the popular perception of threats,
which allows the political pressures inherent in the Exon Florio/FINSA investigations to prevent
CFIUS from accurately balancing security concerns. That was the case when the public and
Congressional unease about high oil prices terminated a relatively innocuous Chinese acquisition
of a U.S. oil company. 152 Protectionist practices are even more evident after the 9/11 attacks
when the public opinion‟s perception of foreign threat and Congressional discomfort with
globalization ran high like in the DPW deal. 153
Although the CFIUS announced its approval of the DPW deal, Congress exercised
political pressure to the extent that DPW could not feasibly move forward with the recently
acquired port management business. As has been the case since the “fears of the Japanese
dominance” in the 1950‟s up to the more recent DPW case, Congress and the public opinion
have taken advantage of the unclear standards of FINSA (then Exon-Florio) to create xenophobic
political pressure on foreign investment strategies and acquisitions. Fairchild, Thomson-LTV,
CNOOC –Unocal, and the DPW deal all represent situations when political pressure and bad
publicity resulted in voluntary withdrawal from a transaction. 154 These transactions demonstrate
that unclear statutory terms permit the public opinion to define the term as a means of opposing
any perceived foreign threat that may not have anything to do with national security.
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Finally, FINSA has unjustly expanded the “national security” concept with the
unqualified inclusion of “homeland security.” The homeland security term is so broad that it has
the potential to turn unrelated issues that impose little or no threat to national security into
national security threats. The risk is that the “homeland security” concept will provide those
opposing an open foreign investment policy an additional argument to define national security as
related to whatever foreign threat is currently in vogue, in a manner does not really involve
national security and instead thwart beneficial foreign investment.
According to the CFIUS‟ 2008 Annual Report to Congress, in the years 2005 to 2007,
companies filed 313 notices of transactions. Roughly eight percent of such notices were
withdrawn during the review stage, five percent resulted in an investigation (45 day review
process), and less than one percent resulted in a Presidential decision. 155 If the U.S. government
can deem the transactions that resulted in presidential action (less than one percent of the total
transactions in a two year period) as legitimate national security threats, then CFIUS must be
reviewing too many transactions that are otherwise outside of its scope of authority. The result is
that the lack of clear guidance regarding the CFIUS review of national security-related
transactions creates additional administrative burdens on the government as well.
Additionally, the CFIUS 2008 report showed that there was no credible evidence of a
widespread coordinated strategy among foreign governments or corporations to acquire critical
U.S. technologies through the use of foreign direct investment.156 If the CFIUS itself has
observed, analyzed, and found that foreign investment has not been used as a national security
threat in the vast majority of transactions that were reviewed between 2006-2008, the
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government should create filters that allow it to focus in transactions that really relate to national
security.
Although a broad national security concept provides the President the necessary flexibility
to deal with real threats not readily fit in any specific category listed in FINSA, the lack of more
specific guidance leaves the government without appropriate filters to discern truly troublesome
cases from nonthreatening ones. The result is an unnecessary burden or inefficiency on foreign
investors, the U.S. government, and the U.S. economy.

B. FINSA’s expanded Congressional Oversight Has The Potential To Unduly Politicize
Foreign Investment
FINSA has significantly increased Congress‟ ability to politicize foreign investment
transactions, even when no real national-security threat exists. It allows members of Congress
(including their staff) to access confidential information regarding CFIUS transactions, which
will likely result in more congressional pressure over certain unpopular transactions. 157
By allowing so many members of Congress (including their staff) to view CFIUS‟s
confidential information, FINSA significantly increases the probability that politicians will
thwart foreign investment deals through political rhetoric, instead of via objective analyses. 158
Another problematic point is that FINSA fails to clarify who decides which information should
remain classified. It is important to note that most of the information being disclosed to Congress
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under FINSA is corporate confidential information. The main concern about this information
sharing is that contents of the reports might leak to the public. 159
In weighing the risks of investing in the United States, foreign investors consider the
consequences of compromising sensitive proprietary information through the CFIUS review
process. Companies are generally unwilling to risk the disclosure of strategic competitive
information during the CFIUS review process if they believe such disclosure could lead to
compromising business objectives and proprietary information. 160 This will likely disincentive
foreign investors and heighten the political nature of foreign investment in the United States
when no risk of national security is at stake. The history of transactions that have been cancelled
as a result of political pressure and negative publicity is long.161 Even before FINSA, Congress
has intervened effectively (although indirectly) to prevent many transactions from being
concluded. 162 That was the case with the Fujitsu-Fairchild proposed deal, CNOOC-Unocal,
Thomson-LTV and DPW. In each instance, Congress exercised political pressure by threatening
to pass legislation specifically banning the transaction. 163 Even when CFIUS approval looked
certain, the parties would abandon the transaction at the prospect of a battle with Congress. This
is illustrated in the DPW case, where despite the CFIUS‟s announcement of approval, DPW
could not feasibly fight Congress. Congressional pressure alone has been a highly effective tool,
if not the most effective one, in preventing undesired deals. 164 Under FINSA, Congress has
statutory authority to access confidential information relating to CFIUS transactions. The risk is
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high that this information sharing will give Congress even more leverage to intervene in foreign
investment transactions.
FINSA should not allow the CFIUS to provide Congress with detailed reports of specific
transactions. It is important that Congress be informed about foreign investment transactions and
their effect upon the nation‟s economy and national security. However, FINSA already requires
detailed annual reports to Congress, which are appropriate for such an assessment. For example,
the CFIUS 2008 report to Congress contains specific findings about potential espionage activities
and foreign intelligence threats.165 By providing the additional briefing and disclosure
requirements (beyond what is provided in the annual reports) FINSA exaggerates transparency to
the detriment of foreign investors.
Additionally, when foreign investors disclose corporate confidential information to
CFIUS they rely on FINSA‟s confidentiality provision and the guarantee of privacy. 166 Without
assurances that corporate sensitive data will be protected, investors might withdraw given the
fear that U.S. competitors or lobbying groups related to specific industry sectors might acquire
access to such information. Domestic competitors could seek to win a bidding war with a foreign
investor by exerting influence on the CFIUS process through lobbying Congress as exemplified
in the Thomson-LTV case, when Thomson‟s American competitor, Martin Marietta, used
national security as a proxy to argue against Thomson‟s bid to acquire LTV. 167 In that case,
Congressional pressure was so intense that Thomson gave up the bid, and Martin Marietta
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eventually acquired LTV.168 Similarly to the Thomson-Marietta situation, there is also the
possibly that special interest groups will likely gain influence in the CFIUS process as a result of
information disclosed to congress. Thus, the potential for political abuse is high.
The U.S. has been a leading example of free market ideas, as well as of policies favoring
foreign investment. However, FINSA‟s allowance of such a close congressional oversight over
CFIUS transactions can negatively impact the free market. Congress has acted in xenophobic
ways as illustrated in the DPW transaction.169 The risk remains that emotionally-charged
messages and arguments aimed at guaranteeing votes during upcoming elections will disrupt the
freedom in private transactions and foreign investment despite the lack of actual national security
risks.
Finally, the continual perceived use of CFIUS as a tool of economic protectionism could
lead to retaliation in the form of restrictions of American foreign investment by other countries.
Perception that CFIUS investigations are based upon political enmity could deter international
cooperation with American foreign policy goals at a time when such cooperation is essential to
global stability and cooperation.
C. FINSA’s Broad Coverage Has the Potential to Burden Foreign Investors and Negatively
Impact Foreign Investment
Foreign investment in the United States has the potential to benefit the domestic
economy,170 even though“national security concerns over the increased opportunities for
espionage and technology disruptions are paramount.”171 Although national security justifies
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governmental monitoring and intervention in cross-border deals taking place in the U.S,
FINSA‟s broad coverage will likely have a negative impact in foreign investment.
From the foreign investors‟ perspective, FINSA‟s new CFIUS review process has several
implications. First, it adds time and risk to the investment due to the CFIUS reviews. Second, it
increases the costs and burdens to involved parties related to the transaction. Third, it adds the
risk that the investor might have to make concessions and enter into mitigation agreements, in
which the government holds more leverage and significantly more bargaining power than the
foreign investor. Fourth, it adds the potential risk that competing domestic bidders may use the
CFIUS review process to manipulate the system and make unsolicited or hostile bids. 172 The
additional time, risk and cost implications will likely serve as a deterrent to some potential
investors who might not welcome the intense scrutiny and lengthy process necessary for the
transaction to proceed. Additionally, the investor must therefore consider additional costs
regarding attorney‟s fees, CFIUS filing fees, production of documents, data, among other
logistical costs associated with approval. These costs exist even when the transaction poses no
national security threat because the CFIUS review is mandatory. Even when investors properly
determine that the transaction will not impose national security threats, such an assessment has to
come from CFIUS itself. 173 Although the CFIUS filing is voluntary, it is also the only way to
avoid risks of divestiture.
Similarly, the risks associated with potential concessions or mitigation agreements are
likely to be a deterrent. Concessions have generally included divesting from subsidiaries with
sensitive technology, and entering into agreements concerning network security, government
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access to critical infrastructure, and voting arrangements. 174 Some foreign investors might be
willing to enter into mitigation agreements when the agreement does not significantly affect the
business‟ management. However, it seems obvious that in many instances the investor will have
to make a difficult and potentially costly decision regardless of the situation. This is aggravated
by the fact that the government holds a significantly stronger bargaining position than any
foreign investor, and is mostly free to impose “take it or leave it” deals. Mitigation agreements
are appropriate when real national security threats are involved, but they should not be used as a
means to disincentive “undesired” transactions or to interfere in the free market.
Competing bidders for domestic acquisitions may use the CFIUS process to their
advantage by manipulating the system thereby making unsolicited hostile bids as exemplified in
the Thomson-LTV and CNOOC-Unocal deals. In the latter case, the American Chevron
Corporation acquired Unocal despite the lack of a real national security threat in Unocal‟s
proposed acquisition by CNOOC. 175 This is merely another factor, or potential barrier, that a
foreign investor must consider when investing in the U.S, especially when it is in a sensitive
industry such as critical infrastructure.
In additional to the implications on foreign investors, multiple implications threaten
domestic companies. The U.S. economy welcomes foreign investment because it depends on it
for economic stability.176 In a globalized and integrated world, economic isolationism can be
disastrous. Given its relatively low savings rate and the global economic crisis, the U.S. depends
heavily on foreign capital inflows to help promote growth and to fund the federal budget
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deficit.177 This is also true at the microeconomic level, where many U.S-based businesses depend
on doing business abroad. Innumerous U.S. business depend on foreign markets to buy their
products and services, as well as to sell to the U.S. companies raw materials, manufactured
goods, commodities, etc.178 Due to this dependence, it is in the best interests of U.S. national
security that other countries provide an efficient and safe investment environment for U.S.
businesses. U.S. businesses could possibly suffer a negative effect when other countries enact
laws similar to FINSA in an effort to retaliate against U.S. isolationism. For example, “Canada,
China and Thailand have all passed legislation creating new rules for foreign investment,
including new screening requirements and reporting regimes.”179
Despite the undisputed need for foreign investment regulation and national security
protection, FINSA‟s current structure is unbalanced. The broad and undefined national security
concept has created additional burdens on foreign investors even when no real national security
threat exists. This structure is likely to disrupt the U.S. free foreign investment policy, the
country‟s domestic economy, and U.S. investment in other markets.

D. Congress Can Improve FINSA by Providing Clear Guidance to Real National Security
Risks, Limiting Congressional Involvement, and Providing a “Fast Track” Analysis for
Passive Investment
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Congress can improve FINSA‟s regulatory scheme by limiting direct congressional
involvement and providing clear analytical guidance to national security risks. FINSA‟s current
structure allows Congress to unduly politicize foreign investment and erode the free foreign
investment policy. 180 Under the U.S. Constitutional system of checks and balances it is important
that Congress has some information relating to foreign investment, but Congress should not have
unbridled access to specific business information and corporate data. The CFIUS annual reports
to Congress suffice for this purpose and contain significant findings and aggregate information
that preserves confidential information. 181
Congress should amend FINSA and direct the CFIUS to issue more specific guidelines
discerning truly troublesome national security risks from nonthreatening ones. Defining national
security is not necessarily the solution, since this is a complex term and involves several
considerations. But limiting FINSA‟s broad and ambiguous national security concept is
necessary. 182 The best option is to require the CFIUS to establish and consider factors that would
render a more through analysis of the alleged national security risk to avoid repeats of the Unocal
deal. 183 For example, CFIUS should take into consideration whether a multiplicity of alternative
supplies to the domestic critical infrastructure would mitigate or terminate risks of supply
shortage. This consideration should take into account national and international alternative
sources. If the domestic “critical infrastructure” company supplies a practically insignificant
amount of the national demand, this should indicate that the acquisition of such company by a
foreign entity creates no national security threat. Implementation of such a standard would have
180
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permitted the parties to conclude the Unocal deal and perhaps many other similar nonthreatening ones.184
CFIUS should also analyze the additional costs involved with alternative supply sources.
If the costs of obtaining the same good or commodity abroad are relatively similar, and the
alternative source is in a U.S. trade partner, this should indicate (at least in most situations) that
no real risk of domestic shortage exists.185 In today‟s global market it is not unreasonable to
acquire critical infrastructure goods or commodities abroad.186 In many situations this method
might be more economically efficient than developing and keeping local industries that cannot
compete with foreign companies that make a better product. Congress should also require that
CFIUS disclose which factors it considered assessing transactions with national security
implications. Congress should require the CFIUS to provide this information in an aggregate
basis, so as to protect the confidentiality of foreign investors‟ information. This method would
enhance transparency in the review process and would save the government and foreign
investors time and investment resources.
Finally, Congress should amend FINSA to provide a simplified and faster (“fast-track”)
analysis for passive investment situations, since they generally do not involve foreign control of
U.S. business.187 This would significantly decrease the time and costs involved in the CFIUS
review process (for the investor and the government), and would likely incentive passive
investors to report each transaction. In addition, a “fast-track” analysis for passive investment
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situations would allow the CFIUS to focus on transactions that could actually affect national
security without spending time and resources on non-threatening and beneficial deals.
IV. CONCLUSION
Protecting national security when actual threats exist is undisputedly necessary. The
question of how far the concept of national security should go to the detriment of a free foreign
investment policy is a more difficult issue to assess. When balancing the competing interests of
national security and foreign investment policy, Congress should be mindful of the impacts of
excessive regulation. When President Ford created the CFIUS over thirty years ago to monitor
foreign investment in the U.S, the world socio-economical context was very different. As foreign
investment intensified over the years, so did Congressional concern of foreign ownership of U.S.
assets.
Congress has significantly amended the CFIUS process to increase the scrutiny of
review. Not surprisingly, the latest amendment (FINSA) came after the 9/11 attacks as an
immediate response to a UAE government-owned company‟s attempt to acquire U.S-based ports
management. FINSA‟s broad sweeping concept of national security, and expanded congressional
oversight provisions has the potential to perpetuate the historical political interference with
foreign investment, and disrupt the U.S. free foreign investment policy. Many pre-FINSA
transactions illustrate these concerns, when protectionist and political considerations interfered
with, and ultimately prevented the conclusion of such transactions. Congress should amend
FINSA to provide clearer analytical guidance to real national security risks (including analysis of
the availability and cost of alternative supply sources), and allow non-threatening transactions to
go on without additional burdens and delays. A simplified “fast-track” review process for passive
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investment would also benefit many foreign investors and decrease FINSA‟s impact in these
types of investment.
Foreign investment is a vital source of job creation, development and employment of
more than 5 million Americans. In a globalized economy where countries are interdependent,
FINSA‟s lenient structure towards protectionist actions has the potential to negatively impact the
free market. Considering that many sectors of the U.S. economy depend on foreign investment,
FINSA‟s ambiguity about national security could be detrimental to the national economy. In the
current state of global economic interdependence it is within the United States‟ best national
security interests to keep a favorable policy towards foreign investment.
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